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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE 
On May 7, 2009 the district court, per the Honorable John K. Butler, granted Defendant-
Respondent Camas County's (hereinafter the "County") Motion for Summary Judgment and 
dismissed Plaintiff-Appellant George Martin's (hereinafter "Martin") declaratory judgment 
action. Martin sought a permanent injunction of Resolution Nos. 114 and 115 (the Camas 
County Comprehensive Plan and Land Use Map, respectively), and Ordinance Nos. 157 and 158 
(the Camas County Zoning Ordinance and Map, respectively). Finding that Martin lacked 
standing, the district court determined Martin failed to demonstrate that he had suffered a distinct 
palpable injury different than that suffered by the citizenry at large with a fairly traceable causal 
connection between the claimed injury and the challenged conduct. l 
II. COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
A. Course of Proceedings in Related Litigation bearing on this action: 
CV 2007-24 
1. On May 4, 2007 in the District Court for Camas County in Case No. CV 2007-24, 
Martin filed a declaratory judgment action against the County seeking the permanent injunction 
of Ordinance 150 (Zoning Map), Ordinance 153 (Zoning Ordinance), Resolution 96 
(Comprehensive Plan), and Resolution 103 (Land Use Map).2 
JR. Vol. I, p. 349-373. 
2 R. Vol. I, p. 6, Vol. 2, p. 357. 
1 
2. The district court granted preliminary injunctive relief on December 28, 20073 
finding that: 
a. The Idaho Administrative Procedures Act applies in declaratory judgment 
actions seeking the injunction of a county's comprehensive plan, land use 
map, zoning ordinance, and zoning map.4 
b. A comprehensive plan, land use map, zoning ordinance, and zoning are 
quasi-judicial in nature and therefore subject to the requirements of 
judicial review even if brought in a declaratory judgment action.s 
c. The County was required to maintain a "transcribable verbatim record" of 
said legislation pursuant to I.C. §67-6536. 6 
3. The Court, however, determined that it need not address Martin's peculiarized 
irreparable injury: 
Plaintiff s primary complaint was a generalized assertion he would suffer from 
increased competition ..... [T]he Court might well issue a preliminary injunction, 
not necessarily because there was particular harm being caused to Plaintiff, but 
because there would be great and irreparable injury being caused to all the 
citizens of Camas County.,,7 
4. On April 2, 2008, the district court issued an additional preliminary injunction 
enjoining not only Ordinance 153, but all predecessor zoning ordinance&jncluding Ordinance 12 
enacted in 1976. 8 
3 R. Vol. 2, p. 253-273. (Decision on Requirements of a Transcribable Verbatim Record and Other Records for 
Purposes of a Preliminary Injuction (hereinafter "Preliminary Injunction I"». 
4 R. Vol. 2, p. 255-256. 
5 R. Vol. 2, p. 256-258. . 
6 R. Vol. 2, p. 258-267; "[B]ecause the action of the county is 'quasi-judicial, and thus reviewable, 'an appeal is 
provided for' under I.e. § 67-6536 and thus a 'transcribable verbatim record' of certain proceedings is required." 
Id. 
7 R. Vol. 2, p. 270. 
8 R. Vol. 2 p. 274-289 (Decision on Conflicts ofInterests Issue for Purposes of Preliminary Injunction (hereinafter 
"Preliminary Injunction II"». 
2 
5. In the April 2, 2008 order, the court held that certain board and commission 
members had a conflict of interest by virtue of ownership of property in the County. 9 
6. The Court also determined in the April 2, 2008 order that "Martin need not show 
that ... Martin was in any way adversely affected,,,10 
If the Court were entering final judgment today, [a permanent injunction] would be the 
result mandated by law without regard to whether Martin himself has suffered or is 
suffering irreparable harm, or any harm whatsoever. As it is, it would appear to be 
irreparable harm to all citizens of Camas County .... " 11 
7. On March 10, 2008, the Board adopted a moratorium (Ordinance 155) on all land 
use applications in order to comply with the Court's Injunction. 12 
8. Thereafter, the County began the planning process to enact new ordinances and 
resolutions which eventually culminated in the Board's adoption, on May 12, 2008, of 
Resolution Nos. 114 and 115 (the Comprehensive Plan and Land Use Map), and Ordinance Nos. 
157 and 158 (Zoning Ordinance and Map). These resolutions and ordinances repealed all 
applicable predecessor legislation. 13 
9. On October 8,2008, Martin sought, and the Court granted him leave to amend his 
complaint to include federal question claims. 14 
10. The County removed CV 2007-24 to the United States District Court for the 
District of Idaho pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441(b) and 1446(b) on November 5, 2008 in Case 
No. CV -1 :08-cv-470. By law, this divested the state court of jurisdiction. 15 
9 R. Vol. 2, p. 280-284. 
!O R. Vol. 2, p. 283. 
11 R. Vol. 2, p. 288. 
12 R. Vol. 1, p.142. 
13 ld. 
14 R. Vol. 2, p. 313. 
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11. On March 17,2009, the United States District Court issued its order retaining the 
federal claims and two state ancillary claims but remanded the declaratory judgment action back 
to the Camas County District Court. 16 By Order dated September 30, 2009, the Federal District 
Court granted the County's Motion for Summary Judgment. 17 
12. In the Interim, on December 3, 2008, the district court erroneously issued his 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order Following Trial. 18 Later, having acknowledged 
it had been divested of jurisdiction by the removal of the action to the United States District 
Court in November, 2008, the court issued its final order on May 29, 2009. 19 
B. Course of Proceedings in This Action: CV 2008-40 
I. In Case No. CV 2008-40, Martin bronght a declaratory judgment action against 
the Connty in the District Court of Camas County, seeking a permanent injunction of Resolution 
Nos. 114 and 115 (the Comprehensive Plan and Land Use Map), and Ordinance Nos. 157 and 
158 for alleged conflicts of interest (I.C. § 67-6506), lack of proper notice (I.C. §§ 67-6509 & 
67-6511), lack of a deliberative process and proper findings of fact (I.e. §§ 67-6508, 67-6509, 
67-6535). Martin additionally sought preliminary injunctive relief?O 
2. The district court denied preliminary injunctive relief on November 10, 2008 
finding that Martin had not suffered irreparable injury. 21 
15 ld; R. Vol. 2, p. 405. 
16 R. Vol. 2, p. 313. 
17 Order, Case No. CV-l:08-cv-470. 
18 R. Vol. 2, p. 290-322. 
19 R. Vol. 2, p. 404-405 (Order Reissuing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order Following Trial). 
20 R. Vol. 1, p. 4-23; R. Vol. 2, p. 357. 
21 R. Vol. 1, p. 92; 79-98 (Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Application for Temporary Restraining Order 
And/Or Preliminary Injunction). 
4 
3. On May 6, 2009, the district court granted the County's Motion for Summary 
Judgment finding that Martin did not have standing to bring a declaratory judgment action 
because he failed to demonstrate he had suffered a distinct, palpable injury different than that 
suffered by citizenry at large with a fairly traceable causal connection between the claimed injury 
and the challenged conduct. 22 
III. STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS 
1. Martin owns or allegedly held an economic interest in the following property:23 
a. Forty acre parcel at 770 E. 240 N. 
i. Prior to the 2007 amendments, the property was zoned Agricultural 
(A) allowing one unit per eighty acres; 
ii. After the 2007/2008 amendments, the property remained 
Agricultural (A). 
1II. To the north, south, east and west the adjoining properties to this 
property were all zoned Agricultural (A) prior to 2007 and thereafter. 
b. Twenty-nine acre parcel west of Soldier road. 
i. Prior to the 2007 amendments, the property was zoned Agricultural 
(A) allowing one unit per eighty acres; 
ii. After the 2007/2008 amendments, the property was upzoned to 
Residential (R -1), allowing one unit per acre and remains so today; 
1II. To the north, south, east and west the adjoining properties to this 
property were all zoned Agricultural (A) prior to 2007, (R-l) after the 
2007 amendments, and remained (R -1) after the 2008 amendments. 
c. One-acre lot within an existing, approved, and platted Homestead 
Subdivision with vested and approved one-acre sized lots. 
1. Prior to the 2007 amendments, the property was zoned (AT); 
ii. After the 2007 amendments, the property was zoned (A-5) 
allowing one unit per five acres;24 
22 R. Vol. 2, p. 371; 349-373 (Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment). 
23 R. Vol. I, p.112-113, 227; R. Vol. 2 p . .350-35I; See Exhibit known as Affidavit of Dwight Butlin in Support of 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, 1122 per the Court's Order to Augment Clerk's Record on Appeal 
Pursuant to I.A.R. 19 and Settlement Pursuant to I.A.R. 29. 
5 
iii. After the 2008 amendments, the property was zoned Residential 
(R-I). 
iv. Prior to the 2007 amendments, the adjoining properties to the 
north, south, east, and west in the subdivision were also zoned (A-T), then 
rezoned to (A-5) in 2007, and rezoned to (R-I) in 2008. 
2. Martin's Contractual Interests: 
a. 160 Acres: Martin is not the owner of this property. He allegedly has a 
contractual interest in the two eighty acre parcels. The northerly eighty 
acre parcel was zoned (A-T) both before and after the 2007-2008 
legislative process; the southern farcel was rezoned from (A) to (R-I) as a 
result of the legislative process.2 
b. 67 acre parcel: Martin alleges that he holds a right of first refusal on a 67 
acre parcel that was rezoned from (A) to (R-I) as a result of the rezoning 
process?6 
3. Comprehensive Planning Process: Beginning in 2005, the County began a 
comprehensive planning and zoning process with the ultimate goal to adopt a new 
comprehensive plan, land use map, zoning ordinance, and zoning map. For two years prior to 
adopting said legislation, the County conducted numerous citizen meetings, workshops, 
informational sessions, public meetings, and ultimately public hearings?7 
4. Rationale: The rationale for adopting a new comprehensive plan and zomng 
ordinance was to protect the health, safety, and welfare of the citizens of Camas County from 
unbridled and unplanned growth.28 Camas County has a population ofless than 1,000 residents 
24 The subdivision is a preexisting subdivision with vested one-acre sized lots. Thus, the 2007 zoning map's 
depiction of this area as (A-5) was in error. The properties were therefore rezoned to (R-I) in 2008 to conform to 
the vested rights of the property owners. 
2S R. Vol. I, p. 113; 227; Butlin Exhibit, 1(22. 
26 R. Vol. I, p. 227; R. Vol. 2, p. 353. 
27 R. Vol. I, p. 139. 
28 R. Vol. I, p. 139-141. 
6 
and overall area of approximately 678,000 acres.29 Only thirty percent of the land in the county 
is under private ownership with the remainder being government owned.3o 
Prior to the 2006/2007 legislation, the entire county was zoned Agricultural (A) (one unit 
per 80 acres) except for specific parcels of property where the owner had sought a rezone.3! The 
prior comprehensive plan adopted in 1997, unfortunately designated entire areas of the county as 
appropriate for Agricultural Transitional ("A-T"), (one unit per acre). Further, the 
comprehensive plan contemplated (R-7) zoning, although no property had ever been re-zoned as 
such.32 Between August, 2001 and November, 2005 approximately thirty-five properties were 
rezoned from (A) to (A_T).33 A total of 2,001 acres were rezoned from (A) to (A-T) between 
March and November of 2005 alone. If the trend of rezones had continued, potentially 92,000 
acres of valuable farm land was at risk of being rezoned from (A) to (A-T). 34 The County did 
not feel the then current comprehensive planning and zoning legislation adequately protected 
agricultural land or provided for potential growth given the economic forecast. 35 The County, 
although not compelled to grant these rezones, realized the necessity of revising its legislation in 
order to limit development in agricultural areas and focus density in areas traditionally 
residential or commercial in character.36 The County decided to wholly abolish (R-7) as a 
zoning designation rendering (R-4) as the densest possible zoning designation. The only 
29 R. Vol. 2, p. 357. 
30 R. Vol. 1, p. 139-141, R. Vol. 2, p.356-357. 
3i ld. 
32 ld; Tr. 72. 
33 R. Vol. 1, p. 140. 
34 R. Vol. 1, P 14l. 
35 ld. R. Vol. 1, p. 68-70. 
36 ld. 
7 
properties in the Connty that would receIve high density residential would be the City of 
Fairfield's area of impact and historical, platted townsites such as Corral, Hill City, Soldier, 
Blaine, and Manard.37 
5. Adoption of 2006/2007 Legislation: The Board of Commissioners ("Board") 
ultimately adopted Resolution 96 (Comprehensive Plan) on May 25, 2006, Resolution 103 
(Comprehensive Plan and Land Use Map) on March 29, 2007, and Ordinance 153 (Zoning 
OrdinarIce) and Ordinance 150 (Zoning Map) on or about April 18, 2007.38 
6. Adoption of 2008 Legislation: The court in CV 2007-24 preliminarily enjoined 
the Connty's 2006/2007 legislation and all predecessor legislation leaving the County without a 
comprehensive plan, land use map, zoning ordinarIce, or zoning map.39 Realizing that this, in 
and of itself, violates the Local Land Use Planning Act ("LLUPA"tO, the County began the 
process to adopt new land use ordinances and resolutions on a county-wide basis. Following 
several duly noticed, public meetings, workshops, and informational sessions, the Commission 
arId thereafter the Board held public hearings41 culminating in the Board's adoption, on May 12, 
2008, of Resolution 114 and 115 (the Comprehensive Plan and Land Use Map), and Ordinance 
157 and 158 (Zoning Ordinance and Map).42 
37 R. Vol. I, p. 68-70; 139-144; 227; Tr. 72-74. 
38 R. Vol. I, p. 14l. 
39 R. Vol. 2, p. 274-289 
40 After 1975, LLUPA provides that all cities and counties "shall" zone and plan (§67-6503) including the adoption 
of a comprehensive plan including a -land use map (I.C. §67-6507-6509) and zoning ordinances including a zoning 
map (§67-65 1 I) and shall adopt hearing procedures (§67-6534) in order to timely process land use applications. 
"[LJandowners have a constitutionally protected property interest in their right to devote their land to any legitimate 
use" Action Apartment Ass 'n, Inc. v. Santa Monica Rent Control Board, 41 Cal.4th 1232, 163 P.3d 89 (2007). 
41 R. 141-144; 350-352. 
42 R. Vol. I, p. 142-143. 
8 
7. Conflict of Interest - Recusal: Although disputed and under appeal, to comply 
with Judge Elgee's Preliminary Injunction I and II, all members of the Planning and Zoning 
Commission, and the Board that owned land in the County recused themselves on the record and 
refrained from participating in the proceedings to adopt said legislation. 43 
8. Martin's Attendance: Martin attended and testified at all hearings.44 
ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL 
Whether the District Court erred in finding that Martin did not have standing to challenge 
the County's comprehensive planning and zoning legislation based upon an alleged denial of 
procedural due process where Appellant admittedly received notice, attended, and testified 
extensively at each and every public hearing. 
ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
The County seeks attorney fees and costs incurred in defending this action in accordance 
with I.C. § 12-117, and Idaho Appellate Rules 40 and 41 for the reason that Martin acted without 
a reasonable basis in fact or law. 
ARGUMENT 
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
When reviewing a district court's grant of summary judgment, the Idaho Supreme Court 
uses the same standard a district court uses when it rnles on a summary judgment motion.45 
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions 
on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as 
43 R. Vol. 2,p. 351-352. 
44 R. Vol. 2, p. 351-352, 371; Tr. 18-19,26. 
45 Ticor Title Co. v. Stanion, 144 Idaho 119, 122, 157 P.3d 613, 616 (2007) (internal citations omitted). 
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to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter 
of law." LR.C.P. 56(c) .... The burden of establishing the absence of a genuine 
issue of material fact is on the moving party. However, if the nonmoving party 
fails to provide a sufficient showing to establish the essential elements of his or 
her case, judgment shall be granted to the moving party. This Court will liberally 
construe all disputed facts in favor of the nonmoving party, and all reasonable 
inferences that can be drawn from the record will be drawn in favor of the 
nonmoving party. [d. If reasonable persons could reach differing conclusions or 
draw conflicting inferences from the evidence presented, then summary jUdgment 
is improper. 46 
"[IJssues considered on summary judgment are those raised by the pleadings.,,47 However, 
pursuant to LR. c.P. 56( e), it is not enough for the non-moving party to rest "upon mere 
allegations or denials of [his] pleadings, but ... must set forth specific facts showing that there is 
a genuine issue for trial. If the party does not so respond, summary judgment ... shall be 
entered. ,,48 A moving party who does not bear the burden of proof at trial may show that no 
genuine issue of material fact remains by demonstrating that "there is an absence of evidence to 
support the non-moving party's case.,,49 
II. I.R.E. 201 JUDICIAL NOTICE 
Martin did not cite to LR.E. 201, address its elements, or cite supporting case law, but 
nonetheless asserts that the district court erred in failing to take judicial notice of the alleged 
preclusive effect of the district court's orders in Case No. CV-2007-24 pursuant to LR.E. 201.50 
The Idaho Supreme Court will not decide issues presented for the first time on appeal. 51 Further, 
46 Boise Tower Associates, LLC v. Timothy Hoagland, 147 Idaho 774, 779, 215 P.3d 494, 499 (2009) (internal 
citations omitted); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.C!. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) . 
47 Bonzv. Sudweeks, 119 Idaho 539, 541, 808 P.2d 876,878 (1991). 
4'I.R.C.P.56(e). 
49 Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. 
50 Appellant's Brief, p. II. 
5l Johnson v. Blaine County, 146 Idaho 916, 920, 204 P.3d 1127, 1131 (2009). 
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LR.E. 201 governs only the "judicial notice of adjudicative facts", which are those "not subject 
to a reasonable dispute in that it is ... capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to 
sources whose accuracies cannot be questioned. ,,52 The determination of Martin's standing is not 
an adjudicative fact, but rather a legal determination. While the legal issue of standing to 
challenge alleged "various procedural and substantive failures to comply with LLUP A and due 
process of law,,53 is similar in each action, the underlying adjudicative facts are not only 
reasonably disputed, but factually distinct. The dates of the hearings, the conduct of hearings, 
Martin's presence at the hearings, the legal notice of the proceedings, the testimony and written 
evidence, the deliberative process, the enactment of the legislation itself, and most importantly, 
Martin's alleged injury entitling him to due process are all based upon factually distinct events. 
Lastly, the Court's factual conclusions drawn in CV 2007-24 are most certainly questioned and 
under appeal to this Court in Docket No. 36055-2009. 
III. RES JUDICATA 
A. Initial Observations - Ripeness and Applicability 
Martin asserts that Judge Butler was collaterally estopped from addressing standing.54 A 
threshold issue is whether the doctrine of res judicata is even applicable to pre-requisites to the 
court's jurisdiction such as standing. Pursuant to Article III of the United States Constitution, 
the Court is required, even sua sponte, to determine whether the plaintiff presents an actual and 
52 l.R.E. 20 I. 
53 Appellant's Brief, p. 2 
541d. p. 11-12. 
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justiciable case or controversy. 55 "It is a fundamental tenet of American jurisprudence that a 
person wishing to invoke the court's jurisdiction must have standing. ,,56 As a subcategory of 
justiciability, the issue of standing therefore does not seem to be one that is subject to an estoppel 
argument. 57 
Martin bears the burden to establish all equitable defenses by a preponderance of the 
evidence. This naturally requires that the issue be properly raised at the district court level with 
supporting case law addressing each of its elements.58 Martin failed to do so, instead merely 
articulating that the proceedings in CV 2007-24 are "binding and controlling precedent" (stare 
decisis?) and the "law of the case" which therefore "collaterally estopped" Judge Butler from 
addressing the issue of standing. 59 He cited to no statute, rule, or case, and, most importantly, 
failed to carry his burden in addressing the elements of either judicial notice or collateral 
estoppel. 60 Raised for the first time on appeal, Martin is precluded from raising said equitable 
defenses whether res judicata, "law of the case,,61, or stare decisii2 
55 U.S. Const. art. III, §2; Van Valkenburgh v. Citizens for Term Limits, 135 Idaho 121, 124, 15 P.3d 1129, 1132 
(2000); Miles v. Idaho Power" 116 Idaho 635, 639, 778 P.2d 757, 761 (1989); Young v. City of Ketchum, 137 Idaho 
102,105,44 P.3d 1157, 1159 (2002). 
56 Id. 
57 State v. Rhoades, 120 Idaho 795, 802, 820 P.2d 665, 672 (1991) . 
. 58 Ticor, 144 Idaho at 122, 157 P.3d at 616. 
59 R. Vol. 2, p. 232. 
60 "Res judicata is an affinnative defense and the party asserting it must prove all of the essential elements by a 
preponderance of the evidence." Waller v. State of Idaho, 146 Idaho 234,237,192 P.3d 1058, 1061 (2008) quoting 
Ticor. 144 Idaho at 122, 157 P.3d at 616. This defense is addressed infra. 
6! The law of the case doctrine is not applicable in this cause of action as the doctrine applies in different stages of 
the same cause of action; not separate actions. See Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 618,103 S.Ct. 1382, 1391, 
75 L.Ed.2d 318 (1983)("[W]hen a court decides upon a rule oflaw, that decision should continue to govern the same 
issues in subsequent stages in the same case".) 
62 The doctrine of stare decisis is not applicable either. When there is controlling precedent on questions of Idaho 
law "the rule of stare decisis dictates that we follow it, unless it is manifestly wrong, unless it has proven over time 
to be unjust or unwise, or unless overruling it is necessary to vindicate plain, obvious principles of law and remedy 
continued injustice." Houghland Farms, Inc. v. Johnson. 119 Idaho 72, 77, 803 P.2d 978, 983 (1990). Martin is not 
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B. Analysis 
Assuming arguendo that res judicata is a viable equitable defense, the doctrine is 
nonetheless inapplicable. The doctrine of res judicata covers both claim preclusion (true res 
judicata) and issue preclusion (collateral estoppel).63 "Whether... issue preclusion bars 
relitigation is a question of law upon which this Court exercises free review.,,64 Collateral 
estoppel, or issue preclusion, "protects litigants from litigating an identical issue with the same 
party or its privy. ,,65 Five factors are required: 
(l) the party against whom the earlier decision was asserted had a full and fair 
opportunity to litigate the issue decided in the earlier case; (2) the issue decided in the 
prior litigation was identical to the issue presented in the present action; (3) the issue 
sought to be precluded was actually decided in the prior litigation; (4) there was a final 
judgment on the merits in the prior litigation; and (5) the p~ against whom the issue is 
asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the litigation. 6 
1. Valid Final Judgment on the Merits 
In CV 2008-40 Judge Butler issued its Memorandum Decision and Order on May 7, 2009 
granting the County's Motion for Summary Judgment.67 In CV 2007-24, Judge Elgee's final, 
valid order was not issued until May 29, 2009.68 Thus, at the time of Judge Butler's decision, 
there was no valid, final judgment in CV 2007-24.69 
relying upon a ruling of our Supreme Court or even Court of Appeals but rather the invalid determinations in one 
trial court (CV 2007-24) as controlling precedent ou another. Judge Elgee's order, even if valid, does not establish 
binding and controlling legal precedent that a court is compelled to follow or a litigant can reasonably rely upon as 
binding precedent. 
63 Ticor, 144 Idaho at 122, 157 P.3d at 616; Hindmarsh v. Mock, 138 Idaho 92, 94, 57 P.3d 803, 805 (2002). 
64 ld. (internal citations omitted); Andrus v. Nicholson, 145 Idaho 774, 777, 186 P.3d 630,633 (2008). 
65 Rodriguez v. Dep't a/Carr., 136 Idaho 90, 92, 29 P.3d 401,403 (2001). 
66 Ticor, 144 Idaho at 124, 157 P.3dat 618 (citations omitted). 
67 R. Vol. 2, p. 349-373. 
68 R. Vol. 2, p. 404-405. 
69 As set forth in Section II.A., paragraphs 9-12 supra, the County removed Martin's federal question claims to U.S. 
District Court in November 2008. The end result of the removal and eventual remand of Count 1II (the declaratory 
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2. Identical Issue Actually Litigated 
Martin asserts that the County did raise the standing issue and was rebuffed.7o This is by 
no means synonymous with being provided a full and fair opportunity to actually litigate and 
decide an identical issue. If an issue is merely raised in the pleadings in the earlier proceeding, 
but not actually litigated or addressed by the court, collateral estoppel does not bar litigation of 
the issue in a later proceeding.71 Collateral estoppel is further not available as to any matters 
which a court expressly refused to determine.72 While standing was the central issue addressed in 
CV 2008-40, Judge Butler noted that it "would appear to this court that the issue of 'standing' 
was not directly addressed in those prior proceedings.,,73 Judge E1gee refused to address Martin's 
peculiarized injury, instead opining that any and all citizens ought to have standing. "Martin 
need not show that .... [he] was in any way adversely affected.,,74 Instead, on behalf of all 
citizens of the county, Martin was vested with standing: 
Plaintiffs primary complaint was a generalized assertion he would suffer from 
increased competition ..... [T]he Court might well issue a preliminary injunction, 
not necessarily because there was particular harm being caused to Plaintiff, but 
judgment action) was the entry of a final order on May 29, 2009; twenty-two days after the final order issued by 
the District Court in this case. While Judge Elgee had issued two preliminary iljjunctions in CV-2007-24, by its very 
natnre, a preliminary injunction is not a valid, final order on the merits. Conceivably, given the many land use 
decisions recently released by the Idaho Supreme Court pertaining to judicial review, Judge Elgee could have 
amended his erroneous preliminary findings. 
70 Appellant's Brief, p. 12. 
71 Ticor, 144 Idaho at 123,157 P.3d at 617; See also 18 Fed.Prac. & Proc. Juris. § 4420 (2d ed.) 
72 !d. Idaho uses a transactional approach. us. Bank Nat 'I. Assn v. Kuenzl4 134 Idaho 222, 226, 999 P.2d 877, 881 
(2000). The prior adjudication extinguishes all claims arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions 
out of which the cause of action arose. Andrus, 145 Idaho at 777, 186 P.3d at 633. Whether a group of facts 
constitutes a "transaction" requires consideration of whether they are related in time, space, origin, or motivation. Id 
The mere fact that the two actions relate to the same subject matter in the general sense does not necessarily 
establish that they are in essence the same cause of action. In the application of res judicata, courts sometimes 
consider whether the same facts are essential to the maintenance of both actions; i.e. If the same facts Or evidence 
would sustain both, the two actions are considered the same cause of action. 
73 R. Vol. 2, p. 357. 
74 R. Vol. 2, p. 284. 
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because there would be great and irreparable lllJUry being caused to all the 
citizens of Camas County.,,75 
If the Court were entering final judgment today, [a permanent injunction] would 
be the result mandated by law without regard to whether Martin himself has 
suffered or is suffering irreparable harm, or any harm whatsoever. As it is, it 
would appear to be irreparable harm to all citizens of Camas County .... " 76 
Martin further contends that the zoning ordinances are "substantially identical".77 The 
ordinances are not identicaJ but, even if they were, the actual text of the ordinances is irrelevant. 
The issues "actually litigated" pertain to the process utilized in enacting the legislation, which, as 
stated herein, are dependant upon factuaJly distinct events, which had not yet even occurred at 
the time the Court in CV 2007-24 issued its preliminary injunctions. 78 
3. Full and Fair Opportunity to Litigate the issue of standing -
Equitable Remedies are Inapplicable where Manifest Injustice will 
result 
Lastly, the doctrine of res judicata is not available where the party against whom the 
doctrine is to be applied did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue decided in 
the earlier case.79 In matters of equity, including those asserted by Martin (res judicata, law of 
the case80, and stare decisii1), fairness is the overriding concern.82 
75 R. Vol. 2, p. 270. 
76 R. Vol. 2, p. 288 .. 
77 R. Vol. 2, p. 409; Appellant's Brief, p. 12. 
78 See Duthie v. Lewiston Gun Club, 104 Idaho 751, 754, 663 P.2d 287, 290 (1983) (holding res judicata 
inapplicable where matters raised in the second suit were not ripe for adjudication in the prior action). 
79 Ticor, 144 Idaho at 124, 157 P.3d at 618. 
so The law of the case doctrine is inapplicable where (I) the first decision was clearly erroneous; (2) an intervening 
change in the law occurred; (3) the evidence on remand was substantially different; (4) other changed circumstances 
exist; or (5) a manifest injustice would otherwise result. United States v. Cuddy, 147 F .3d 1111, 1114 (9th Cir.1998); 
Arizona, 460 U.S. at 618, n. 8, 103 S.Ct. at 1391, n. 8; See also 18-134 Moore's Fed. Prac.-Civ. § 134.21[1]. 
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The district court's determinations, or lack thereof, in CV 2007-24 are clearly 
erroneous.83 It would be manifestly unjust to collaterally estop the court in CV 2008-40, a court 
[Wlhen the law of the case doctrine is applied by a court to its own prior decisions, or to the decisions of a 
coordinate or equal court that has made a prior determination in the case, the doctrine is properly 
characterized as discretionary in nature .... It is not a limit on a court's power to revisit an issue if the court 
feels such review is necessary. 
United States v. Scrivner, 189 F.3d 825, 827 (9th Cir.1999), (quoting Merritt v. Mackey, 932 F.2d 1317, 1320 (9th 
Cir.1991); Union Pacific v. Idaho State Tax Commission, 139 Idaho 572, 575, 83 P.3d 116, 119 (2004). 
81 Similarly, "the rule of stare decisis dictates that we follow [controlling precedentl, unless it is manifestly wrong, 
unless it has proven over time to be unjust or unwise, or unless overruling it is necessary to vindicate plain, obvious 
principles oflaw and remedy continued injustice." Houghland, 119 Idaho at 77, 803 P.2d at 983. 
Wbile it is important that parties and their counsel have predictability regarding the law so that they may 
make informed decisions in the conduct of their affairs, when the judicial interpretation of a statute is 
manifestly wrong, stare decisis does not require that a court continue an incorrect reading of the statute.)' 
Id 
We have stated frequently that we will not follow prior incorrect decisions merely because the cases exist. 
The rule to stand by decided cases and to maintain former adjudications contemplates more than blindly 
following a former decision even if it is manifestly wrong. 
Sherwoodv. Carter, Jl9 Idaho 246, 256,805 P.2d 452, 462 (1991). 
82 Even where the threshold elements of collateral estoppel are met, some courts additionally require that it: 1) 
conduct a fundamental fairness analysis before applying the doctrine; 2) consider whether preclusion would 
contravene public policy or result in manifest injustice; 3) not apply the doctrine mechanically in situations in which 
it would lead to inequitable results; 4) not apply the doctrine in circumstances where its purposes would not be 
served; or 5) the public interest requires re-litigation not be foreclosed. Am.Jur. Judgments §490 at p. 1. 
Other states have directly addressed this issue of fairness / manifest injustice and fairness in the context of Res 
Judicata. In the State of Washington, for example, an essential element for the application of collateral estoppel is 
whether the application of the doctrine will work an il\iustice on the party against whom the doctrine is to be 
applied. Rains v. State, 100 Wash.2d 660, 665, 674 P.2d 165, 169 (1983). In California, the courts will decline to 
apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel when preclusion would not serve the public interest or might work an 
injustice. Kopp v. Fair Political Practices Comm'n, II Cal.4th 607, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 108,905 P.2d 1248 (1995). 
83 Among the myriad of reversible errors alleged by the County on appeal in Case 36055-2009 are: 
1. IAPA: The district court determined that the provisions of IAPA apply to declaratory judgment actions 
challenging comprehensive planning and zoning legislation. R. Vol. 2, p. 256. 
2. Quasi-Judicial/Legislative Distinction: "Camas County clearly engaged in 'quasi-judicial' activity when 
it held noticed public hearings for the purpose of passing· amendments to its Comprehensive Plan, and when it 
rezoned large portions of the county .... " R. VoL 2, p. 293. 
3. Transcribable Record: The district court found that a transcribable record is required "regardless of 
whether an appeal is ... ultimately available ... " rather than where "an appeal is provided for" pursuant to I.e. §67-
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of equal jurisdiction, from addressing the issue of standing given the clearly erroneous holdings 
of the court in CV 2007-24. Judge Butler correctly determined that the issue of standing, i.e. 
particularized injury, was not directly addressed in CV 2007-24. As such, the County was not 
provided a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue of standing in CV 2007-24. If the 
rationale behind the doctrine of res judicata is to promote judicial economy and prevent 
inconsistent results,84 such worthy interests should not be at the expense of justice. 
IV. STANDING 
A. Overview - A Justiciable Case or Controversy 
Although the Declaratory Judgment Act, Idaho Code § 10-1201 et seq, bestows the 
authority to declare rights, status, or other legal relations, that authority is curtailed by the rule 
that declaratory judgment can only be rendered in a case where an actual or justiciable 
6536. The district court further found that a transcribable record is required not only for the public hearings, but for 
what fhe court characterized as "deliberations leading up to quasi-judicial public hearings and which the 
Comprehensive Plan and new zoning were adopted" rather than only for "public hearings ... regarding a pending 
application ... or which '" the board deliberates .... after ... compilation of the record." I.C. §67-6536. R. Vol. 2, p. 
295,314. 
4. Written Findings of Fact. Conclusions of Law. The district court held that because the county had 
taken evidence and testimony in the exercise of a quasi-judicial function ... due process considerations 
apply '" [and] the county must make written findings of fact and conclusions of law .... Whether the 
county is acting on a particular application or on its own recommendation from its P&Z affects whefher a 
party might be able to seek judicial review, but it does not affect the requirements imposed by statutes and 
case law as to whether the county must make written findings and conclusions. 
R. Vol. 2, p. 305-306. 
5. Alleged Procedural Defects. The district court held that the County had committed notice and publication 
errors as a basis to overturn the challenged legislation where Martin clearly testified at each and every public 
hearing. 
6. Legal Notice to the General Public: The district court held that Martin was empowered to bring an action 
on behalf of the general public of which some might possibly did not have a meaningful opportunity to be heard; 
that the plaintiffs actual notice is no defense and the county is held to a higher due process standard than that 
afforded to affected persons in a judicial review context. R. Vol. 2, p. 312-313. 
84 Appellant's Brief, p. 11. 
17 
controversy exists.8s Where other legal doctrines address when to bring an appeal, the law of 
standing governs the question of who may initiate an action.86 Justiciability is thus a 
fundamental prerequisite to the jurisdiction of the court. 87 To satisfy the standing requirement, 
Martin bears the burden to demonstrate that he had suffered a distinct palpable injury different 
than that suffered by the citizenry at large, with a fairly traceable causal connection between the 
claimed injury and the challenged conduct.88 
B. Martin's Property did not incur a Distinct Palpable Injury 
The core requirement in the law of standing is that Martin demonstrates an injury in fact. 
"[I]t is clear ... that to have standing the land owner must allege or demonstrate an actual or 
potential harm or injury by reason of the challenged zoning ordinance amendment.,,89 The 
district court correctly determined that Martin had not suffered harm because his properties were 
" U.S. Const. art. III, §2; Miles, 116 Idaho at 639, 778 P.2d at 761; Young, 137 Idaho at 105,44 P.3d at 1159). 
("The doctrine of standing is a subcategory of justiciability.") 
86 Miles, 116 Idaho at 641, 778 P.2d at 763 ("The doctrine of standing focuses on the party seeking relief and not the 
issues the party wishes to have adjudicated."). 
87 Rhoades, 120 Idaho at 802, 820 P.2d at 672. 
88 Rural Kootenai Org., v. Board ofCom'rs, 133 Idaho 833, 841, 993 P.2d 596, 604 (1999); Student Loan Fund of 
Idaho, Inc. v. Payette County, 125 Idaho 824, 828, 875 P.2d 236, 238 (Ct. App. 1994). See also Lujan v. Defenders 
of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,560,112 S.Ct. 2130,119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). 
Over the years, our cases have established that the irreducible constitutional minimum of standing contains 
three elements. First, the plaintiff must have suffered an "injury in fact" - an invasion of a legally 
protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) "actual and imminent", not 'conjectural' 
or 'hypothetical;' "Second, there must be a causal connection between tbe injury and the conduct 
complained of - the injury has to be "fairly ... trace[able] to tbe challenged action of the defendant, and not 
... th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third party not before the court." Third, it must be 
"likely", as opposed to merely "speculative", that the injury will be "redressed by a favorable decision." 
89 R. Vol. 2, p. 362. 
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simpl);' not downzoned.9o Rather, they either remained the same or were even upzoned allowing 
greater density in development:91 
Property Original Zone After Result 
Rezone 
I. 40 acre parcel Agriculture (A) (I Unit (A) No 
_per 80 acres) change 
2. 29 acre parcel Agriculture (A) (l Unit (R-I) Upzone 
per 80 acres) 
3. One Acre Lot Agriculture Transitional (R-I) Upzone 
(A-T) (l Unit per acre) 
Martin does not own but allegedly has a contractual interest in two eighty acre parcels: 
Northern Parcel (A-T) (A-T) No 
change 
Southern Parcel (A) (R-I) Upzone 
Martin does not own but allegedly holds a right of first refusal on a 67 acre parcel: 
I (R-I) I Upzone 
Martin freely admitted that the county-wide rezone increased the value of all agriculturalland.92 
The result of the legislative amendments is that Martin's land was rezoned from agricultural land 
to residential uses.93 Thus, "Mr. Martin by his own admission has not been harmed by the 
rezone as to the value of his property".94 
90 R. Vol. 2, p. 364. 
91 R. Vol. 2, p. 364-365; Tr. p. 41-47. 
92 R. Vol. 2, p. 369. 
93 R. Vol. 2, p. 364-365. 
94 R. Vol. 2, p. 369. 
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C. Martin is not harmed by virtue of Increased Inventory 
Martin asserts that the very zoning legislation that upzoned his property from agricultural 
to residential uses nonetheless caused him injury because it also rezoned approximately 20,000 
acres permitting "various densities of residential housing," that were previously agricultura1.95 
This created an "over supply of residential property" and a "diminished demand on all residential 
property in general.,,96 This "increased competition" thereby reduced the value of his land 
causing him an immediate and peculiarized financial injury.97 Martin's logic evidences his 
motive: if he can keep everyone else's property agricultural, he can upzone his property to 
residential uses effectively eliminating competition. 
1. Martin confuses a comprehensive plan land use designation with a 
zoning designation 
As a preliminary observation, Martin fails to grasp the difference between a 
comprehensive plan and zoning ordinance. Martin alleged that he possessed a "unique parcel" 
where "high density growth was desired,,98, but the rezone of approximately 20,000 acres in the 
county resulted in the "downzone" of his approximately 160 acres from an (R-7) to an (R-l) on 
the comprehensive land use map thereby injuring him because he can no longer develop his 
property pursuant to the prior planning scheme.99 The Court noted Martin's misstatement: 
95 To put in perspective, 20,000 out of the 678,000 acres were given residential zoning designations. R. Vol. 2, p. 357. 
96 R. Vol. 2, p. 367. 
97 Id; Appellant's Brief, p. 18. 
98 Tr. p. 22. 
99 R Vol. 2, p. 366; Tr. p. 22. 
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"It is clear that the plaintiff contends that the elimination of the R-7 designation as part of 
the comprehensive land use map is a downzone. However, this contention is not 
supported by the law .... 100 
An (R-7) designation on a comprehensive plan land use map does not confer a vested property 
rightlOl and Martin has not suffered harm by virtue of a subsequent change to the land use map. 
As the district court correctly observed: 
The mere fact that the comprehensive land use map may have designated some of the 
plaintiffs property as R-7 for development does not mean that the County would be 
compelled to rezone the property as such since the comprehensive land use map is but 
one component to the comprehensive plan and does not act as "legally controlling zoning 
law". 102 
It is undisputed that no property in Camas County was ever re-zoned to (R_7).103 (R-7) was a 
designation that existed on the original comprehensive land use map but never materialized into 
an existing zone. After the 2007 amendments the (R-7) designation ceased to exist. 104 Plaintiff 
has not suffered a peculiarized injury by virtue of a change to a comprehensive plan land use 
map designation. 
100 ld. "[Tlhere is a substantial difference between plauning and zoning. Plauning is long range; zoning is 
immediate. Plauning is general; zoning is specific. Plauning involves political processes; zoning is a legislative 
function and an exercise of the police power. ... Plauning has a speCUlative impact upon property values, while 
zoning may actually constitute a valuable property right. ... The Plan is a statement of long-range public intent; 
zoning is an exercise of power which, in the long run, should be consistent with that intent. ... " Giltner Dairy, LLC 
v. Jerome County, 145 Idaho 630, 633,181 P.3d 1238, 1241 (2008). 
101 ld "To have a property interest, a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire." "A mere 
'unilateral expectation' of a benefit or privilege is insufficient; the plaintiff must 'have a legitimate claim of 
entitlement to il'." Nunez v. City of L.A., 147 F.3d 867, 872 (9th Cir. 1998); Doran v. Houle, 721 F.2d 1182, 1186 
(9th Cir. 1983). 
102 R. Vol. 2, p. 365-366; See also Bone v. City of Lewiston, 107 Idaho 844, 693 P.2d 1046 (1984); Giltner, 145 
Idaho at 630, 181 P.3d at 1238; Urrutia v. Blaine County, 134 Idaho 353, 358-359, 2 P.3d 738, 743-744 (2000). 
Collectively these cases provide that a land use map designation depicting the contemplated future use of property 
does not mandate its present approval; i.e. there is no vested right conferred and a landowner is not entitled to an 
upzone simply because it is consistent with comp plan. This or even a denial based solely on non-compliance with 
the comprehensive plan would elevate the plan to the level of a legally controlling zoning law. 
103 R. Vol. 2, p. 365. 
t04 Tr. 70-72. 
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2. Increased Inventory is not a peculiarized injury but a generalized 
grievance 
The district court noted that the vast majority of jurisdictions hold that in the arena of 
zoning decisions standing does not exist when alleged damages flow from reduced income or 
value based on increased or perceived unfair competition. 
Generally, persons whose only complaint is that the rezoning ... would create 
competition with them in the conduct of their business have been held not to have 
standing to litigate the validity of the zoning action. lOS 
[A] person whose sole interest for objecting to a zoning board's action is to 
prevent competition with his or her business is not a person aggrieved, and 
therefore does not have standing to challenge a zoning decision in court. 106 
More importantly, Martin failed to show how increased inventory via a county-wide rezone is a 
"peculiar or personal injury that is different than that suffered by any other member of the 
public.,,107 
But even if a showing can be made of an injury in fact, standing may be denied 
when the asserted harm is a generalized grievance shared by all or a large class of 
citizens. 108 
As a general rule, a citizen or taxpayer, by reason of that status alone, does not 
have standing to challenge governmental action. "An interest, as a concerned 
citizen, in seeing that the government abides by the law does not confer standing." 
... "A citizen or taxpayer may not challenge a governmental enactment where the 
injury is one suffered alike by all citizens and taxpayers of the jurisdiction." ... 
The general rule holds even if the citizen or taxpayer alleges some indirect harm 
from the governmental action. I 09 
105 4 Rathkopfs The Law of Zoning and Planning §63.34 (4th ed. 2005). 
106 83 AmJur.2d Zoning and Planning §926 (2003). 
107 Young, 137 Idaho at 104,44 P.3d at 1159. 
1081d. 
109 Koch v. Canyon County, 145 Idaho 158, 161, 177 P.3d 372 (2008) (internal citations omitted). 
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Martin's injury must be a "harm or peril personal to him; a "peculiarized" harm different than 
that felt by the community at large. I 10 If over 20,000 acres of agricultural land is admittedly 
benefited by a county-wide rezone permitting residential zoning and Martin's property is 
inclusive of said property then Martin has: I) not suffered injury that is ... 2) different than that 
suffered by the citizenry at large. Whether Martin terms it as a benefit to all agricultural land or 
detriment to all residential property due to increased competition is immaterial as it is a 
generalized grievance shared by a large class of citizens. II I 
D. Upzone to Adjacent Property 
In defense, Martin asserts that he had suffered a peculiarized injury different than the 
general citizenry in that the property adjacent to his 29 acre parcel received a higher density than 
he did; that his property was simply "left out of the upzone".112 The facts and law do not support 
his legal position. Martin freely admits that his 29 acre parcel was upzoned from Agricultural 
(A) (one house per 80 acres) to (R-I), but asserts that the land to the north and south was rezoned 
to (R-4), to the east to (R-I) and (A-IO), and to the west to (R_I).1l3 This is flatly untrue. The 
properties to the north, south, east, and west were all rezoned in exactly the same fashion as 
Martin's properties; i.e. an upzone to Residential (R-l) to his property saw an upzone to the 
110 Rural Kootenai, 133 Idaho at 841, 993 P.2d at 604. 
III Student Loan. 125 Idaho at 828, 875 P.2d at 240. Martin relies upon Ameritel, 141 Idaho at 849, 119 P.3d at 624. 
AmeritelInns was deemed to have standing to challenge the Auditorium District's use of public funds for the 
construction of a second convention center. As an operator of three hotels in the Auditorium District with 
competing convention space, Ameritel Inns was among a limited number of tax payers within the District suffering a 
particularized injury not suffered alike by all citizens within the District. As a tax payer it was required to fund the 
proposed convention center that was in direct competition with its existing business interest. Id 141 Idaho at 853, 
119 P.3d at 628. 
112 Appellant's Brief, p. 16 
JJ3 R. Vol. 1, p. 156. 
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neighboring property to (R_I).114 Martin's own zoning map in support of its brief in opposition 
to summary judgment clearly demonstrates that the property surrounding his 29 acre parcel were 
all rezoned to (R-ll A-T) allowing one unit per acreYs The only properties in the County that 
received (R-4) density, as stated herein, is in the City of Fairfield's area of impact and historical 
townsites such as the Solider Townsite as depicted on Martin's zoning mapY6 Regardless, his 
false assertions are simply immaterial. Martin still bears the burden to demonstrate how a 
county-wide rezone in and of itself, causes him a distinct palpable injury different than that 
suffered by the general citizenry. 
I. Proximity Alone Does not Confer Martin with Standing. 
While proximity can be an important factor, 
this Court will not look to a predetermined distance in deciding whether a 
property owner has, or does not have, standing .... 117 
Simply because RKO's members may own property near the proposed 
subdivision, the location of their property alone does not confer standing. 18 
The standard is rather the magnitude of the injury sustained. 
Status as an owner of land within a designated area does not relieve a complainant 
of the necessity of demonstrating a 'distinct palpable injury' traceable to the 
challenged govermnental conduct. It is the quality or magnitude of the injury 
suffered which must differentiate a plaintiff from the citizenry at large in order to 
confer standing. The situs of owned property in relationship to an area touched 
by an ordinance is relevant to a standing inquiry onl? insofar as the property's 
location exposes the landowner to peculiarized harm. II 
114 R. Vol. I, p. 227; p. 68-70; 139-144; Tr. 72-74; See also Butlin Affidavit, ~22.b. 
115 1d. 
116 ld. 
117 Evans v. Teton County, 139 Idaho 71, 75, 73 P.3d 84, 88 (2003). 
liS Cowan v. Bd. O/Comm'rs o/Fremont County, 143 Idaho 501, 148 P.3d 1247 (2006). 
119 Student Loan, 125 Idaho at 827,875 P.2d at 239. 
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Martin cites to several cases to support his position; none of which are applicable to the facts 
attendant here. In Butters v. Hauser, the plaintiff challenged the conditional use permit and the 
underlying zoning ordinance that enabled the adjacent property owner to construct a cell phone 
tower. The Court noted the "close proximity" of the proposed cell tower that ... 
looms over her land; ... its physical invasiveness affects her enjoyment of her 
property. Although the location of her property alone does not confer standing, 
the location does expose her to peculiarized harm. In particular, Butters contends 
that she had to spend $1,500 for a new telephone system to eliminate the tower's 
radio signal from her telephone and that the tower's radio signal still broadcasts 
through her daughter's compact disc system. 120 
The Court concluded that the plaintiff had standing due to the tower's proximity AND its 
deleterious effects. 121 In Evans v. Teton County, a neighboring property owner had standing to 
bring judicial review to challenge a 780 acre Planned Unit Development and upzone from (A-
2.5) to (R-l) which included an l8-hole golf course, clubhouse, pro shop, maintenance buildings, 
fishing ponds, equestrian facility, 100-room hotel, 50 overnight units, health club and tennis 
facility, swimming pool, restaurant, conference rooms, nordic ski facility, storage facilities, 
helicopter pad, parking lots, 18 two to three acre ranch estates, 100 three-quarters to one acre 
golf estates, 170 one-third to one-half acre golf homes, 180 five thousand square foot residential 
lots, and 100 overnight cabin lots from one thousand to twenty-five hundred square feet. 122 The 
Court concluded that a neighboring property owner could be adversely affected by such a 
development. Similarly, in Cowan, a neighbor was deemed to have standing to seek judicial 
review of a subdivision application for 29 lots on 86 acres after presenting persuasive evidence 
120 Butters v. Hauser, 131 Idaho 498, 501, 960 P.2d 181, 184 (1998). 
1211d. 
122 Evans, 139 Idaho at 73, 73 P.3d at 86. 
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that his property would be adversely affected by the approval of a subdivision application. 123 In 
Evans v. Ed. of Comm 'rs of Cassia County, a neighbor brought judicial review challenging a 
Special Use Permit for a gravel pit. 124 
2. Martin's complete absence of evidence ofpeculiarized injury. 
In contrast, "Mr. Martin by his own admission has not been harmed by the rezone as to 
the value of his property.,,125 Martin freely admitted that the "rezone increased the value of 
agricultural land, which all of his land was previously zoned.,,126 The mere fact that "adjacent 
lands" also received an upzone to various residential densities does not in and of itself 
demonstrate a distinct palpable injury to Martin. 
The only evidence of Martin's alleged financial injury is Martin's personal opinion. 
Martin failed to present any objective evidence such as an appraisal, real estate comparables, or 
other like objective criteria free of convoluting factors such as the overall downturn in the 
economy that would demonstrate this financial injury. Pursuant to LR.C.P. 56(e), Martin cannot 
escape summary judgment based upon mere conclusory allegations, but "must set forth specific 
facts showing that there is a genuine issue". 
Flimsy or transparent contentions, theoretical questions of fact which are not 
genuine, or disputes as to matters of form do not create genuine issues which will 
preclude summary judgment. Neither is a mere pleading allegation sufficient to 
create a genuine issue as against such affidavits and other evidentiary materials 
which show the allegation to be false. A mere scintilla of evidence is not enough 
to create an issue; there must be evidence on which a jury might rely. A popular 
123 Cowan, 143 Idaho at 509, 148 P.3d at 1255. 
124 Evans v. Bd o/Comm'rs o/Cassia County, 137 Idaho 428,50 P.3d 443 (2002). 
125 R. Vol. 2, p. 369. 
126Id 
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formula is that summary judgment should be granted on the same kind of showing 
as would permit direction of a verdict were the case to be tried. 127 
In its Memorandum Decision, the Court noted: 
Martin '" argues that the rezone will reduce the value of the lands that he has an 
economic interest in; that he will suffer decrease in available services and an 
increase in taxes; and that the rezone will prevent him from developing the land as 
he would have been able under the pre-existing zoning scheme. . .. However, 
there are no such factual allegations in the plaintiffs complaint. Further, the 
affidavit of Mr. Martin does not allege that his taxes have increased as a result of 
the rezone; the affidavit does not allege that there has been a decrease in available 
services to his property or what services are not available to his property; he 
admits that the rezone increased the value of agricultural land, which his land was 
previously zoned. As to the allegation that he cannot develop his land as he had 
intended, such an allegation is contrary to the facts and law ... It is simply is yet 
nndetermined whether the land can be developed as intended. 
In oral argument, the district court rather succinctly questioned Martin's counsel: 
[W]hat precludes Mr. Martin from making [an] application to the county to 
amend the comprehensive land use map and to amend the zoning ordinance as to 
his property adjacent to these properties that you say are zoned R-4 to the north 
and south ... and have his application acted upon, have him applying for a permit 
for a subdivision development, if its approved, he suffers no harm; correct? ... 
And if his applications and permits are denied, does he then not have, because of 
a permit to develop an R-4 subdivision has been denied, does he then not have 
judicial review?128 
E. Martin does not have standing to challenge a denial of due process. 
The other marked differences between this action and the line of cases Martin cites is 
each of those actions pertained to "permits authorizing development" entitled to judicial review 
127 Petricevich v. Salmon River Canal Co., 92 Idaho 865, 871, 452 P.2d 362 (1969) (quoting 3 
Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 1234, p. 133 (Rules ed. 1958); Jenkins v. 
Boise Cascade Corporation, 141 Idaho 233, 238, 108 P.3d 380, 385 (2005). Other materials 
"can be used to pierce the formal allegations of the pleadings and to show that what appears on 
the face of the pleadings alone to be a genuine issue of fact is in reality not a genuine issue at 
all." Id. 
128 R. Vol. 2, p.144 
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vs. comprehensive planning and zoning, which, as legislative activity, is subject to a declaratory 
judgment action. This Court's recent judicial review land use decisions as well as the line of 
cases cited by Martin pertain to a neighbor's objection to a specific land use application, i.e. 
"permits authorizing development". 
The granting of a permit authorizes ... development ... if it places a developer in 
a position to take immediate steps to permanently alter the land' without further 
action of the governing board. 129 
A subdivision application, a PUD for a golf course and subdivision, a conditional use permit to 
operate a gravel pit or cell phone tower each place the applicant in a position to take immediate 
steps to permanently alter the land. The requisite standing and due process afforded to such an 
affected party differs from the standing and general notice requirements applicable to legislative 
activity. To have standing to challenge a permit authorizing development, a petitioner need only 
meet the elements of I.C. § 67-6521; not the prima facie evidence of actual harm required 
pursuant to I.C. § 67-6535(c). 
The language in I.C. § 67-6535(c) instructing courts that "[oJnly those whose 
challenge to a decision demonstrates actual harm or violation of fundamental 
rights, not the mere possibility thereof, shall be entitled to a remedy or reversal of 
a decision" cannot be construed as a standing requirement. The existence of real 
or potential harm is sufficient to challenge a land use decision. I.C. § 67-6535(c) 
requires a demonstration of actual harm or violation of a fundamental right in 
order to be entitled to a remedy in cases disputing a LLUP A decision. 130 
129 Johnson, 146 Idaho at 920, 204 P.3d at 1131 (quoting Payette River Prop. Owners Ass 'n v. Ed. of Comm 'rs of 
Valley County, 132 Idaho 551, 555, 976 P.2d 477, 481 (1999)). Decisions involving applications for planned unit 
developments, conditional use permits, and the development of subdivisions "all constitute decisions granting 
permits." ld.; see also I.e. §§ 67-6512, 67-6513, & 67-6515. 
130 Evans, 139 Idaho at 76,73 P.3d at 89. 
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The level of due process afforded to such an "affected person" under LLUPA's judicial review 
provisions require I) legal notice; 2) a meaningful opportunity to be heard; 3) adequate findings 
of fact, conclusions of law (I.C. § 67-6535); and 4) a transcribable record (I.e. § 67-6536). 131 
In contrast, a comprehensive plan or zoning ordinance does not confer an immediate right 
to permanently alter land; hence it is not subject to judicial review. 132 To have standing, a 
challenger bears the burden to demonstrate that he had suffered a distinct, peculiarized, actual 
injury different than that suffered by the citizenry at large with a fairly traceable causal 
connection between the claimed injury and the challenged conduct. 133 Affecting a large area of 
many parcels of disparate ownership, the due process afforded to such legislative activity134 
13I Cowan. 143 Idaho at 508, 148 P.3d at 1254; see also I.e. §§67-6509, 6521, 6535, and 6536. 
132 Giltner. 145 Idaho at 630, 181 P.3d at 1238; Burns Holdings. LLC v. Madison County Board o/Commissioners. 
147 Idaho 660, 214 P.3d 646 (2009). 
133 Rural Kootenai. 133 Idaho at 841, 993 P.2d at 604 (1999). 
134 The "promulgation or enactment of general zoning plans and ordinances is legislative action." Cooper v. Board 
o/County Commissioners 0/ Ada County. 101 Idaho 407, 409, 614 P.2d 947,949 (1980); Burt v. City o/Idaho Falls. 
105 Idaho 65, 67, 665 P.2d 1075, 1077) (l983)("Legislative activity by a zoning entity is differentiated from quasi-
judicial activity by the result - legislative activity produces a rule or policy which has application to an open class 
whereas quasi-judicial activity impacts specific individuals, interests or situations."). 
Action is legislative when it affects a large area consisting of many parcels of property in disparate 
ownership .... Conversely, action is considered quasi-judicial when it applies a general rule to a specific 
interest, such as a zoning change affecting a single piece of property, a variance, or a conditional use 
permit. '" It is analogous to a general rezone which affects a large number of people-in this case, multiple 
owners of multiple tracts of land approxhnating over eight hundred individuals, each with varying affected 
interests and impacts, and which is highly visible to the pUblic. . .. The amendment of the plan and zoning 
of the annexed property affects the interests of all persons in the city in some manner. Such widely felt 
impact and high visibility is consistent with action deemed legislative. 
Burt, 105 Idaho at 66, 665 P.2d at 1077. 
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merely entitles any interested person to 1) notice and 2) a meaningful opportunity to present and 
rebut testimony. 135 
In McCuskey v. Canyon CountyJ36, Mr. McCuskey's vested building permit to erect a gas 
station and store was revoked by virtue of the County's rezone of his property from heavy 
industrial to rural residential. Mr. McCuskey challenged the enactment of the comprehensive 
plan and zoning ordinance itself for failure to comply with the notice provisions of I.C. § 67-
6511 (b), which would have provided him constructive, if not actual, notice of the adoption of the 
zoning ordinance. He had neither. Thus, Mr. McCuskey clearly suffered a distinct palpable 
injury (stop work order revoking a vested building permit) with a fairly traceable causal 
connection to a procedural error; i.e. (failing to provide him due process pursuant to I.C. § 67-
6511(b) (actual, constructive, or legal notice of the hearing of the county-wide rezone). 
1. Martin's Actual Notice Precludes his Procedural Due Process 
challenge. 
Like Mr. McCuskey, Martin is challenging the legislation itself seeking to enjoin not only 
the zoning map, but Camas County's comprehensive plan, land use map, and zoning ordinance 
"as violative of the substantive and procedural requirements ofIdaho's Local Land Use Planning 
Act".137 Martin specifically asserts that he was denied procedural due process due to numerous 
alleged procedural violations pertaining to defective notice or other publication requirements. 
135 See I.e. §§ 67-6509, 6511; Neighbors/or a Healthy Gold Forkv. Valley County, 145 Idaho 121, 126, 176 P.3d 
126,131 (2007); Spencer v. Kootenai County, 145 Idaho 448, 454,180 P.3d 487, 493 (2008); Cowan, 143 Idaho at 
512,148 P.3dat 1258. 
136 McCuskeyv. Canyon County, 123 Idaho 657, 851 P.2d 953 (1993). 
137 Appellant's Brief, p. 2. The entirety of Appellant's Brief is limited to argument pertaining to the zoning map and 
thus Martin seems to concede a lack of standing to challenge the comprehensive plan, land use map, and zoning 
ordinance. 
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While the County disputes these allegations, they are also immaterial. Pursuant to I.C. §67 -6509 
and §67-6511, Martin was certainly entitled to procedural due process which requires that he be 
provided notice and an opportunity to be heard. 138 Martin freely admits that he had notice of, 
attended, and testified extensively at each and every public hearing and most, if not all, public 
workshops, informational sessions, relative to the adoption of the challenged legislation. 139 
Unlike McCuskey, and more akin to Cowan, Martin's actual notice trumps, or precludes, 
standing to challenge a denial of procedural due process based upon alleged defective notice. 
[T]he Board concedes that both notices were defective. Nonetheless, Cowan has 
failed to demonstrate that his substantial rights were prejudiced by either 
defective notice. First, Cowan's counsel attended the ... hearing and submitted a 
brief objecting to notice. Moreover, Cowan spoke against the application at that 
hearing. Therefore, even if the notice were defective, Cowan has failed to 
demonstrate how this defect prejudiced his substantial rights since he clearly had 
notice of the meeting. 140 
2. Lack of Distinct Palpable Injury: Martin has not had a permit or 
vested right revoked or land use application denied 
Unlike Mr. McCuskey, Martin has not submitted an application nor had a permit, 
application, or other vested right revoked pursuant to the challenged ordinances. His property 
has not been downzoned. Martin has simply not sustained a peculiarized injury different than 
that of the general citizenry. The county-wide rezone has not altered the permitted uses of his 
land should he wish to submit a land use application.!4! As to neighboring properties, Martin 
138 See Neighbors. 145 Idaho at 126, 176 P.3d at 131; Spencer, 145 Idaho at 454, 180 P.3d at 493; Cowan, 143 Idaho 
at 512, 148 P.3d at 1258. 
139 R. Vol. 2, p. 370; Tr. 18-19,26. 
140 Cowan, 143 Idaho at 513, 148 P.3d at 1259. 
141 Id. at 826, 875 P.2d at 238. 
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has not identified any land use applications that are pending or that have been 
granted by the County which have caused or will cause any particular harm to the 
plaintiff or any of his alleged financial interests. The potential for a development 
of the land at one density is not the same as the immediate ability to develop the 
land at that density. ... The plaintiff has not established that he was actually 
engaged in development or even that he had the immediate ability, through a 
lawful permit, to develop. As such, the plaintiff has failed to support his 
argument that the rezone by the County caused him r:eculiarized hann due to the 
potential for added inventory of residential property. 1 2 
The declaratory judgment act is not a forum for those with general complaints about the conduct 
of one's local governing board. 143 As the district court concluded, Martin does not have standing 
merely because he "is a concerned citizen who seeks to ensure that a governmental entity abides 
by the law".144 Yet, this is what Martin asserted at oral argument; that he has standing as a de 
facto private attorney general. Martin's legal counsel even so acknowledged that while "[ilt is 
no longer the law, .,. in many ways it is exactly the role that Mr. Martin has been playing. ,,145 
3. Legislative Discretion; Martin merely wishes to second-guess the 
legislative acumen of the elected officials 
What is additionally important to note about the McCuskey decision is that the Court did 
not substitute its judgment for that of the board as to whether the property should or should not 
be downzoned from industrial to residential. 146 Perhaps there were legitimate reasons to zone the 
142 R. Vol. 2, p. 369. 
143 Ameritel Inns, Inc. v. Greater Boise Auditorium Distrct, 141 Idaho 849, 852, 119 P.3d 624,627 (2005) citing 
Thomson v. City o/Lewiston, 137 Idaho 473,50 P.3d 488 (2002) 
144 Id; R. Vol. 2, p. 372 .. 
145 Tr. p. 149-150. 
146 Planning and zoning decisions are entitled to a strong presumption of validity. Spencer, 145 Idaho at 452,180 
P.3d at 491. The burden of proving that the ordinance is invalid rests upon the party challenging its validity and the 
presumption in favor of validity can be overcome only by a clear showing that the ordinance as applied is 
confiscatory, arbitrary, unreasonable, and capricious. Where there is a basis for a reasonable difference of opinion, 
or if the validity ofJegislative classification for zoning purposes is debatable, a court may not substitute its judgment 
for that of the local zoning authority. Sprenger, Grubb, & Associates v. City 0/ Hailey, 127 Idaho 576, 581, 903 
P.2d 741, 745 (1995); Burt, 105 Idaho at 68, 665 P.2d at 1078 quoting Cooper, 101 Idaho at 410, 614 P.2d at 950 
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property as residential. I47 There is no right to a particular zoning designation; 148 Mr. McCuskey 
simply had the right to notice and an opportunity to testify. Similarly, while Martin randomly 
asserts that he disagrees with the legislative acumen of the elected officials, he does not advance 
a cogent legal argument supported by case law that the challenged legislation deprived him of a 
vested, cognizable right to substantive due process. 149 The United States Supreme Court has 
unequivocally stated that a municipal ordinance would survive a substantive due process 
challenge so long as it was not "clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation 
to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare."lso Once it is determined that an 
ordinance serves the general welfare, the Courts will not second-guess the wisdom of the 
enactment. IS I In fact, a plaintiff challenging a land use regulation must demonstrate that the 
regulation "fails to serve any legitimate govemmental objective," rendering it "arbitrary or 
irrational.,,152 So long as some reasonably conceivable basis exists to support the land use 
regulation, or the reasonableness is at least debatable, the regulation will be upheld even if the 
"Legislative action is shielded from direct judicial review by its high visibility and widely felt impact, on the theory 
that the appropriate remedy can be had at the polls." Id. 
147 This is a purely academic consideration. The revocation of a vested building permit would pose additional 
difficulties for the county in McCuskey. 
148 "Once again, we hold that a property owner has no vested interest in the highest and best use of his land, in the 
solely monetary sense of that term." Sprenger, 127 Idaho at 581,903 P.2d at 746 quoting Dawson Enters., Inc. v. 
Blaine County, 98 Idaho 506, 519, 567 P.2d 1257, 1270 (1977), overruled on other grounds by Cooper, 101 Idaho 
at 411, 614 P.2d at 951. 
149 In CV 2007-24 Martin did seek leave to amend its complaint to add federal substantive due process claims, which 
the County properly removed to the United States District Court before the Honorable Candy Dale in Case No. CV-
I :08-cvA70. (R. 313). Judge Dale rather quickly granted the County's Motion for Summary Judgment dismissing 
Martin's federal claims. 
150 Village ofEuclidv. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395, 47 S.Ct. 114,71 L.Ed. 303 (1926) (emphasis added); 
See also Dry Creek Partners, LLC v. Ada County, 148 Idaho 11,217 P.3d 1282 (2009); Spencer, 145 Idaho at 456, 
180 P.3d at 495. 
151 Dry Creek, 148 Idaho at 21 citing Euclid, 272 U.S. at 388. 
152 Lingle v. Chevron US.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 542, 125 S.C!. 2074, 161 L.Ed.2d 876 (2005); see also Shanks v. 
Dressel, 540 F.3d 1082, 1088 (9th Cir.2008) . 
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means chosen are not the best method to further the regulation's purpose. 153 In short, Courts are 
extremely deferential to legislative authority and are reluctant to invalidate subdivision/zoning 
ordinances, in essence, sitting as "super-legislatures" or zoning boards of appeal. 154 This is 
academic as Martin fails to substantiate his disagreement with the legislative jUdgment of the 
elected officials in the form of a cogent legal theory. 
F. The Plain Text of LLUPA's Judicial Review prOVISIOns clearly 
evidence they are inapplicable to Comprehensive Planning and 
Zoning. 
In adopting comprehensive planning and zoning, Martin asserts that: 1) the County is 
acting in a quasi-judicial capacity and thus LLUP A's enhanced due process requirements are 
applicable to such activity; and 2) that Martin has the standing to assert or be afforded these 
enhanced due process protections in a declaratory judgment action. The plain text of LLUPA's 
judicial review provisions does not support Martin's position. 
1. I.C. § 67-6521: Martin is not an "affected person" 
For Martin to invoke the judicial review protections of LLUP A, he must qualify as an 
"affected person".155 An "affected person" is "one having an interest in real property which 
may be adversely affected by the issuance or denial of a permit authorizing the development."I56 
Martin asserts that a county-wide rezone meets this definition of a "permit authorizing 
development". The Idaho Supreme Court has clarified that planning and zoning decisions are 
only subject to the judicial review provisions of the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act 
153 rd. 
154 See Dry Creek, 148 Idaho at 19. 217 P.3d at 1290 citing State v. Clark, 88 Idaho 365, 375, 399 P.2d 955, 961 
(1965). 
155 See I.e. § 67-6521(1); Evans, 139 Idaho at 74, 73 P.3d at 87. 
156 § 67-6521(1)(a) (Emphasis Added). 
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("lAP A") and the Local Land Use Planning Act ("LLUP A") if there is a statute authorizing or 
granting a right to judicial review. 157 The adoption of a comprehensive plan land use map, initial 
zoning, or even the rezoning of a single property have not been interpreted to be a "permit 
authorizing development" authorizing judicial review. IS8 
2. To invoke LLUPA's Enhanced Due Process Provisions, Martin's 
Exclusive Remedy is a Petition for Judicial Review for which he is 
ineligible. 
Martin seeks to invoke LLUPA's and lAP A's judicial review provisions in a declaratory 
judgment action. 159 A petition for judicial review is the exclusive means for an affected party to 
invoke LLUPA's enhanced due process provisions. While a party may bring a declaratory 
judgment action in situations not subject to judicial review, this does not entitle a plaintiff to 
bypass the mandated and exclusive jurisdictional and administrative procedures in favor a 
declaratory judgment action to invoke LLUPA's enhanced due process provisions. 160 
157 R. Vol. 2, p. 357-358. Highlands Development Corp. v. City a/Boise, 145 Idaho 958,188 P.3d 900 (2008). 
15' Id; Burns, 147 Idaho at 660, 214 P.3d at 646; Giltner, 145 Idaho at 630, 181 P.3d at 1238; See also I.C. §§ 67-
6507,6508,6509, and 6511. 
159 Appellant's Brief, p. 22-23: 
160 Euclid Ave. Trust v. City 0/ Boise, 146 Idaho 306, 193 P.3d 853, 855 (2008). A declaratory judgment action may 
not be used to avoid the consequences of failing to comply with statutory procedural requirements. Ag Air, Inc. v. 
Idaho State Tax Com 'n, 132 Idaho 345, 972 P.2d 313 (1999). "Actions for declaratory judgment are not intended as 
a substitute for a statutory procedure and such administrative remedies must be exhausted." V-I Oil Company v. 
County 0/ Bannock, 97 Idaho 807,810,554 P.2d 1304, 1307 (1976) Petitions for declarative judgment are simply 
outside the scope of §67-6519, 67-6521 and IDAPA, which set forth the exclusive procedures for seeking review of 
adverse zoning decisions. Regan v. Kootenai County, 140 Idaho 721, 100 P.3d 615 (2004); Bone, 107 Idaho at 844, 
693 P.2d at 1046; McCuskey, 123 Idaho at 686, 851 P.2d at 982. 
In Euclid, the Supreme C0U11 held that lAP A defines the scope of review and the rype of relief available to 
an applicant who had been denied a permit or aggrieved by a decision. "Ifthe agency action is not affirmed, it shall 
be set aside, in whole or in part, and remanded for further proceedings as necessary." Idaho Code § 67-5279. "By 
failing to mention any further remedial measures, it is reasonable to conclude that combining a claim for civil 
damages with a petition for judicial review is not a permissible course of action." Id. 146 Idaho at 308,193 P.3d at 
855. Thus, IAPA limits a plaintiff's ability to choose between a petition for judicial review and a declaratory 
judgment. Id; Bone, 107 Idaho at 844, 693 P.2d at 1046. 
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3. Idaho Code § 67-6536 Transcribable Records 
I.C. § 67-6536 provides: 
In every case in this chapter where an appeal is provided for, a transcribable 
. verbatim record of the proceeding shall be made.... The proceeding envisioned 
by this statute for which a transcribable verbatim record must be maintained shall 
include all public hearings at which testimony or evidence is received or at which 
an applicant or affected person addresses the commission or governing board 
regarding a pending application or during which the commission or governing 
board deliberates toward a decision after compilation of the record. 
(emphasis added). Reference to "an appeal" unquestionably means a petition for judicial review 
pursuant to I.C. § 67-6521, which is not provided for county wide comprehensive plarming and 
zoning legislation. Further, a transcribable record is required only for a public hearing 
pertaining to a pending application at which an applicant or affected person addresses the 
Board, evidence is received, or the Board deliberates after compilation of the record. Here, there 
is no pending application; no applicant; and no affected person. Thus, no transcribable record is 
required. Of course, this is purely academic as the County has in fact maintained audio 
recordings of all public hearings pertaining to the comprehensive plan, zoning ordinance, and 
map, which the District Court reviewed pursuant to Martin's Preliminary Injunction motion. 161 
Further, pursuant to Idaho Code §67-6509, a "record of the hearings, findings made, and actions 
taken" shall be maintained by the County. Audio recordings of each and every public hearing 
and deliberation thereafter satisfy this requirement. Against the plain text of the statute, Martin 
wishes to add the word "written" to this requirement; that a written record, a transcribed record, 
161 R. Vol. 1, p. 83. 
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i.e. findings of fact, conclusions of law must be created. There is no such affirmative obligation 
required beyond the plain language of the statute. 
4. I.e. § 67-6535: Written findings off act, conclusions oflaw. 
I.C. § 67-6535 provides that the approval or denial of any application provided for in 
LLUP A shall be based upon standards as set forth in the comprehensive plan and zoning 
ordinance, and to be in writing. As stated herein, there has been no approval or denial of an 
application that would subject comprehensive planning and zoning legislation to the quasi-
judicial review provisions of LLUP A. Further, it is illogical that a proposed comprehensive plan 
and zoning ordinance are to be "based upon standards as set forth in the comprehensive plan and 
zoning ordinance", i.e. based upon itself. Lastly, the zoning ordinance, map, comprehensive 
plan, and land use map are already written documents which in and of themselves are public 
records promulgated in a public hearing and contained in the record. 162 Res Ipsa Loquitur: the 
thing speaks for itself. 
G. Redressability 
Martin must not only demonstrate actnal harm with a cansal connection to the challenged 
governmental conduct, but also that the relief sought shall redress or cure his alleged injury.163 
Even if Martin is able to demonstrate that he has snffered a distinct palpable injury, is it "likely 
... that the injnry will be redressed by a favorable decision,,?164 Martin has fully exercised his 
due process rights of a citizen of Camas County by fully participating at each and every public 
162 See Evans, 139 Idaho at 73. 
163 Koch, 145 Idaho at 161, 177 P.3d at 375; Miles, 116 Idaho at 641, 778 P.2d at 763. 
164 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560, Miles., 116 Idaho at 641,778 P.2d at 763. 
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hearing, meeting, information session, and work shop. While he disputes the outcome, if Martin 
is successful in enjoining the zoning map amendments, the only result is the 20,000 acres of 
formerly agricultural property, including Martin's property, will revert to back to agricultural 
uses. Martin fails to articulate a reasonable explanation of what injury this will redress other 
than eliminate Martin's competition. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the County respectfully requests that this Court affirm the 
Order of the Honorable John K. Butler in Case CV 2008-40. 
Dated this 9' ~y of February, 2010. 
MOORE SMITH B XTON & TURCKE, CHTD. 
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